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THE HIDDEN COST OF ROD AND RIFLE: WHY STATE FISH 
AND GAME LAWS MUST BE AMENDED IN ORDER TO 
PROTECT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND 
SEIZURE IN THE GREAT OUTDOORS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Recreational anglers1 and hunters assume many burdens before 
casting a line or taking aim from a tree stand.2 For example, 
Maryland requires licenses/ limits activity to specific seasons,4 and 
places restrictions on equipment5 as conditions to recreational 
hunting and fishing. Beyond these expected burdens, however, an 
unanticipated cost has emerged that threatens anglers' and hunters' 
Fourth Amendment privacy rights. From California's piers to the 
Montanan wilderness to even the calm waters of the Chesapeake Bay, 
hunters and anglers are subjected to warrantless searches by game 
wardens, often without probable cause or reasonable suspicion of any 
game violation.6 
At first blush, these kinds of intrusions on an individual's privacy 
would appear to directly contravene well-established protections 
under the Fourth Amendment.7 State courts, however, have upheld 
warrantless administrative searches of anglers' and hunters' boats, 
vehicles, and storage containers as valid under the United States 
Constitution. 8 
I. "Angling," is a method of fishing with a hook and line, and an "angler" is one who 
fishes by "angling." MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 97A.015, subdiv. 2 (West 2009). 
2. Tree stands allow hunters to observe and hunt deer from a hidden vantage point up in 
a tree. See Basic Treestand Hunting Techniques, OUTDOOR ADVENTURES NETWORK, 
http://www.myoan.net/huntingart/deer _stand_ techniques.html (last visited June 10, 
2013). 
3. See MD. CoDE ANN., NAT. REs. § 10-306 (LexisNexis 2007) (establishing a hunting 
license requirement); id. § 4-610 (establishing a fishing license requirement). 
4. See id. § 4-603 (providing for fishing seasons); id. § 10-415 (providing for deer 
hunting season). 
5. See, e.g., id. § 10-426 (prohibiting hunting with a gun or device via Internet 
connection); id. § 10-418 (requiring specific outerwear for hunters); id. § 4-617 
(prohibiting angling with certain types of lines and lures). 
6. See infra Part II.B. 
7. See discussion infra Part Ill. A. 
8. See, e.g., People v. Maikhio, 253 P.3d 247, 256, 262-63 (Cal. 2011) (upholding 
warrantless administrative stop and search of defendant's vehicle after warden 
observed defendant fishing lobster); State v. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Minn. 2003) 
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Under the administrative search exception to the Fourth 
Amendment warrant requirement, game wardens may perform 
warrantless administrative searches without probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion of a violation, simply because hunting and 
fishing are closely regulated activities.9 Consequently, even though 
anglers and hunters are private citizens engaged in seemingly 
innocuous recreational activities, they are subject to the same 
warrantless intrusions on their privacy as firearms dealers or mine 
operators. 10 
Although it is crucial for states to be able to enforce their fish and 
game laws and preserve wildlife populations for subsequent 
generations, 11 basic privacy protections should not have to face 
extinction as a result. 12 Unfortunately, the vitality of the warrantless 
administrative search exception for closely regulated activities has 
greatly diminished anglers' and hunters' privacy rights under the 
Fourth Amendment. 13 Rather than rely on privacy protections under 
the Constitution, the best remedy for anglers and hunters to preserve 
their privacy rights is through legislation that would limit game 
wardens' search and seizure authority under state fish and game 
laws. 14 
This comment will explore how explicitly defining game wardens' 
search and seizure powers under state fish and game laws would be 
the most practical means to preserve hunters' and anglers' privacy 
rights, notwithstanding the warrantless administrative search 
exception to the Fourth Amendment. 15 Specifically, this comment 
will propose that game wardens may stop suspected anglers and 
hunters to demand exhibition of licenses and any fish or game that 
(holding that game warden was entitled to search defendant's boat despite no 
suspicion of fishing violation); State v. Boyer, 42 P.3d 771, 773, 779 (Mont. 2002) 
(upholding warrantless search of defendant's live well fish container). 
9. See infra Part II.B. 
10. Compare Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d at 2, 9 (upholding warrantless administrative search 
on recreational angler), and Maikhio, 253 P.3d at 256, 262-63 (upholding warrantless 
administrative stop and search of defendant's vehicle after warden observed defendant 
fishing lobster), with Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 606 (1981) (upholding 
warrantless administrative searches in the mining industry), and United States v. 
Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 317 (1972)(upholding warrantless administrative searches 
against an arms dealer). 
II. See Scott Witty, It's a Keeper: Preserving Minnesota's Recreational Fishing by 
Allowing Effective Regulatory Enforcement, 26 HAMLINE J. Pus. L. & POL'Y 151, 154 
(2004). 
12. See infra Part III.C.l. 
13. See infra Part II.B. 
14. See infra Part III.C.l-2. 
15. See infra Part III.C.l. 
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the person possesses, but a more intrusive administrative search could 
be performed only if the game warden develops independent 
suspicion of a violation. 16 
Part II provides background on the development of the 
administrative search exception to the traditional warrant requirement 
under the Fourth Amendment, tracing its expansion from the use of 
less stringent administrative warrants to the execution of warrantless 
administrative searches whenever an activity is closely regulated. 17 
Additionally, Part II addresses how the warrantless administrative 
search exception has been applied against anglers and hunters in 
states across the country to permit warrantless searches and 
seizures. 18 
Part III discusses why previous challenges to the exception's 
constitutionality, in the fish and game context, have failed, 19 and 
examines why state constitutional amendments purporting to expand 
citizens' privacy rights would likely be insufficient to protect hunters 
and anglers.20 
Expanding upon the Supreme Court of California's interpretation 
of California's fish and game laws in People v. Maikhio/1 Part III 
argues that limiting game wardens' administrative search and seizure 
powers through more specific state laws would be the most 
reasonable method for striking a proper balance between wildlife 
protection and privacy rights.22 Lastly, Part III will analyze 
Maryland's fish and game laws and propose legislative amendments 
to ensure that outdoors enthusiasts' rights are preserved in proper 
balance with the state's interest in wildlife preservation.23 
16. See infra Part III.C.l-2. 
17. See infra Part II.A. 
18. See infra Part II.B. 
19. See infra Part III. A. 
20. See infra Part III.B. 
21. People v. Maikhio, 253 P.3d 247 (Cal. 2011). 
22. See infra Part III. C.!. 
23. See infra Part III.C.2. 
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II. THE EXPANSION OF WARRANTLESS ADMINISTRATIVE 
SEARCHES AND THEIR APPLICATION TO 
RECREATIONAL FISHING AND HUNTING LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
A. From Camara to Burger: Warrantless Administrative Searches 
under the Fourth Amendment 
Under the Fourth Amendment, individuals have the right to be free 
from unreasonable searches and seizures.24 In order for Fourth 
Amendment protections to apply, the individual searched must have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched.25 Generally, 
police must obtain a warrant or have probable cause before 
performing a search or seizure.26 However, courts recognize that 
when there is a reduced expectation of privacy in the area to be 
searched, the traditional warrant and probable cause requirements are 
relaxed. 27 
Despite the Fourth Amendment's seemingly clear wording, 
exceptions to the warrant requirement abound.28 The administrative 
search exception-first established by the United States Supreme 
Court in Camara v. Municipal Court--originally provided for less 
stringent administrative warrants to perform regulatory inspections, 
rather than require the traditional search warrants used by police.29 
Under Camara, the Court recognized that when state inspections 
are aimed at citywide compliance with a regulatory scheme, rather 
than a criminal investigation, an administrative warrant need not be 
issued by a judge and need not be supported by probable cause.30 
24. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides that: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
25. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
26. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
27. See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 707, 712 (1987) (upholding warrantless 
inspection because operator of vehicle dismantling business had a diminished 
expectation of privacy). 
28. See, e.g., Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 35-36 (1979) (search incident to 
arrest); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566 (1976) (fixed internal 
border checkpoints); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976) (hot pursuit); 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 32 (1968) (stop and frisk). 
29. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538-39 (1967). 
30. Jd. at 535-36. 
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Instead, administrative warrants could be issued by the pertinent 
administrative agencyY Accordingly, the Court indicated that, 
although administrative inspections implicate Fourth Amendment 
privacy rights, the level of the intrusion and the lack of satisfactory 
alternatives to enforcement render the exception necessary.32 
After establishing administrative warrants as a means to ensure 
regulatory enforcement, the Supreme Court subsequently recognized 
an exception for warrantless administrative searches for certain types 
of industries. 33 Under the "closely regulated" business exception to 
the administrative warrant, the Court recognized that some 
administrative agencies need the ability to conduct surprise 
inspections in order to enforce regulations on businesses that have a 
pervasive history of regulation. 34 
In Donovan v. Dewey, the Court further relaxed the warrantless 
administrative search standards.35 There, the Court upheld 
warrantless administrative searches of a coal mine, despite the fact 
that coal mining did not have a long history of pervasive regulation.36 
So long as the business was subject to comprehensive regulations, 
administrative agencies could perform warrantless inspections 
without any suspicion of a violation.37 
Finally, in New York v. Burger, the Supreme Court upheld the 
warrantless inspection of a junkyard, and established the current 
framework for determining the constitutionality of warrantless 
administrative searches.38 Under Burger and its progeny, the Court 
has determined that suspicionless inspections are proper without an 
administrative warrant so long as: (1) the state has a substantial 
interest in regulating the industry or activity; (2) the regulations could 
not be effectively enforced if the officials needed reasonable 
suspicion of a violation before inspection; and (3) the persons or 
businesses to be searched are engaged in an industry or activity that 
reduces the reasonable expectation of privacy so that those parties 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 536-37. 
33. See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 317 (1972); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. 
United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970). 
34. See, e.g., Colonnade, 397 U.S. at 75, 77 (permitting surprise inspections of retail 
alcohol businesses). 
35. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602 (1981). 
36. Id. at 605-06. 
37. Id. at 600. 
38. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702-03, 707-08, 712 (1987). 
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have notice that they are subject to random inspection within 
reasonable time, place, and scope limitations.39 
B. An Unfair Hunt? Warrantless Administrative Searches in the 
Great Outdoors 
Due to its vast land and abundant wildlife, Minnesota's courts have 
seen frequent disputes over warrantless administrative searches of 
hunters and anglers;40 however, this is not solely a Minnesota 
controversy.41 Many states have wrestled with the parameters of 
game wardens' search authority, as inspections once reserved for 
notorious industries now are executed against private citizens merely 
enjoying themselves in the great outdoors.42 
States across the country have comprehensive regulatory schemes 
to preserve their wildlife populations, dictating everything from 
hunting and fishing seasons to proper equipment.43 Consequently, 
under the administrative search exception, game wardens have the 
authority to inspect hunters' and anglers' property, without suspicion 
of a violation.44 
Many suspicionless inspections performed by game wardens are 
fairly innocuous, such as requests to produce licenses or tagged game 
at checkpoints.45 Such interactions are expected and generally do not 
39. Burger, 482 U.S. at 707-11; see also Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 
602, 627 (1989) (expanding warrantless searches to employees of industries that are 
regulated to ensure safety); Nat'! Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 
665-67, 62, 679 (1989) (expanding warrantless drug testing for U.S. Customs 
employees who apply for certain positions). 
40. See, e.g., State v. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d 1, 7, 9 (Minn. 2003); State v. Larsen, 637 
N.W.2d 315, 317 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001); State v. Krenz, 634 N.W.2d 231, 235-36 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2001). 
41. See, e.g., Tarabochia v. Adkins, No. Cl0-5197BHS, 2011 WL 3475492, at *4 (W.D. 
Wash. Aug. 9, 2011); People v. Maikhio, 253 P.3d 247, 251 (Cal. 2011); State v. 
Boyer, 42 P.3d 771, 776 (Mont. 2002). 
42. See, e.g., Maikhio, 253 P.3d at 256, 262-63; State v. Tourtillott, 618 P.2d 423, 430 
(Or. 1980); State v. Halverson, 277 N.W.2d 723, 724-25 (S.D. 1979); Monroe v. 
State, 253 S.W.2d 734, 734-36 (Tenn. 1952). 
43. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text. 
44. See, e.g., Maikhio, 253 P.3d at 258-59, 262-63 (discussing the administrative search 
exception's application to fish and game enforcement). 
45. See United States v. Fraire, 575 F.3d 929, 930 (9th Cir. 2009) (upholding game 
checkpoint outside of a national park); United States v. Buehler, 793 F. Supp. 971, 
975-76 (E.D. Wash. 1992) (upholding conviction for failure to exhibit fishing 
license). 
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spur confrontation or resistance.46 Yet when game wardens attempt 
to search boats, vehicles, and other property, the reasonableness of 
the search comes into question.47 
For instance, in State v. Colosimo, a game warden and an angler 
argued over the warden's authority to search the anglers' boat for fish 
while the boat was parked on land waiting for portage.48 The game 
warden cited the angler for refusing an inspection, and the angler 
challenged on grounds that the game warden lacked probable cause to 
search the boat,49 which justified his refusal of the search.50 
Ultimately, the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the angler's 
conviction.51 The Court stressed that the state's regulatory scheme 
provided for suspicionless fish inspections and that such measures 
were the only reasonable way to enforce the recreational fishing 
regulations. 52 Further, the Court held that Colosimo did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the rear platform of his boat. 53 
Hence, the game warden would not have exceeded his authority to 
search for fish in that limited area. 54 
Similarly, in State v. Boyer, the Montana Supreme Court likewise 
upheld a warden's authority to search a fishing boat with only 
reasonable suspicion of a violation.55 There, the Court upheld an 
angler's conviction for possession of unlawfully killed game fish, 
over the angler's contention that the game warden physically intruded 
onto his fishing boat without probable cause.56 The dispute arose 
when the game warden stepped onto the transom57 of Boyer's boat to 
46. See Malin J. Stearns, Note, It's Good to Be the Game Warden: State v. Boyer and the 
Erosion of Privacy Protection for Montana Sportsmen, 65 MONT. L. REv. 187, 206 
(2004). 
47. See Witty, supra note 11, at 173-80. 
48. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d at 2-3. Portage is the process of transporting boats and gear 
across land between two bodies of water. Witty, supra note 11, at 156 n.19. 
49. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d at 2-3. Colosimo, an attorney, argued that under section 
97A.215 of the Minnesota Statutes, the warden could not search Colosimo's boat 
without probable cause of a fish or game violation. /d. 
50. /d. 
51. Jd.at9. 
52. !d. at 6. 
53. /d. 
54. /d. at 6-7. 
55. State v. Boyer, 42 P.3d 771, 773, 777 (Mont. 2002). 
56. /d. at 773-74. 
57. In nautical terms, the transom is the exterior platform at the rear of the boat. /d. at 
773. 
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inspect Boyer's live well58 to determine whether the angler exceeded 
the daily catch limit.59 Boyer argued that despite the extensive 
regulatory scheme for recreational fishing,60 under section 
87.1.506(1)(b) of the Montana Code, a warden may only perform a 
warrantless search of an angler's property with probable cause to 
believe that a game violation took place.61 
The Court, however, disagreed.62 Rather than consider the 
warden's actions as a search, the Court held that the warden merely 
performed an administrative inspection, limited to reasonable places 
where the angler would store his fish. 63 Consequently, the warden's 
entry onto the boat on less than probable cause was constitutional as a 
warrantless administrative search.64 
Ultimately, Boyer and Colosimo demonstrate the breadth of the 
warrantless administrative search exception.65 In both Minnesota and 
Montana, state laws purported to limit game wardens' authority to 
perform certain warrantless searches only upon probable cause. 66 
The courts, however, stressed the need for wardens to inspect for fish 
and game violations.67 Accordingly, the courts determined that the 
anglers lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in their boats, and 
thus the administrative inspections limited to searches only for fish 
were proper. 68 
58. A live well is a container in a boat used to hold caught fish in water in order to 
preserve freshness. Witty, supra note 11, at 159 n.47. 
59. Boyer, 42 P.3d at 773. 
60. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN.§ 87.1.502(3) (West 2007) (authorizing game wardens to 
enforce fish and game licensure); id. § 87.1.502(6) (mandating the production of fish 
and game at the warden's request). 
61. Boyer, 42 P.3d at 775. 
62. /d. at 775-76. 
63. /d. 
64. /d. 
65. See Witty, supra note 11, at 180-89. 
66. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 97A.215, subdiv. 1 (West 2009) (noting that wardens may 
search vehicles and containers upon probable cause of possession of unlawful fish or 
game); MONT. CODE ANN.§ 87.1.506(1)(b)(2007) (noting that wardens may search 
without a warrant upon probable cause of a game violation). 
67. Witty, supra note 11, at 180-88. 
68. !d.; see also People v. Maikhio, 253 P.3d 247, 249-51 (Cal. 2011). 
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Ill. HOW TO PRESERVE PRIVACY RIGHTS FOR HUNTERS 
AND ANGLERS 
A. Constitutional Challenges to Warrantless Administrative 
Searches are Dead-Ends 
809 
Outside of a brief mention in Justice Blackmun's concurring 
opinion in Delaware v. Prouse, the Supreme Court has yet to discuss 
the constitutionality of game wardens' warrantless inspections.69 
However, cases in state appellate courts and federal trial courts have 
wrestled with a game warden's authority to search for fish and game 
violations without a warrant or probable cause. 70 With a few specific 
exceptions/1 the majority of these cases have sided with the 
government, finding that the state's interest in preserving its wildlife 
is sufficient cause to permit the warrantless inspections. 72 
Although commentators and dissenting judges may disagree, 
claiming these intrusions to be unconstitutional, 73 game warden 
inspections are almost always upheld under the warrantless 
administrative search exception.74 Typically, these inspections meet 
the first two prongs under Burger-a substantial state interest and no 
adequate alternative for enforcement-with little controversy.75 
Fishing and game laws are nearly ubiquitous,76 and most states 
consider those regulations vital in order to preserve wildlife 
populations for current populations and future generations.77 Further, 
69. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 664 (1979) (Blaclunun, J., concurring) (clarifying 
that the holding of the case did not address the constitutionality of "the necessarily 
somewhat individualized and perhaps largely random examinations by game wardens 
in the performance of their duties"). 
70. See Edwin J. Butterfoss & Joseph L. Daly, State v. Colosimo: Minnesota Anglers' 
Freedom from Unreasonable Search and Seizures Becomes "The One That Got 
Away," 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 527, 545 (2004). 
71. Generally, courts have recognized a higher expectation of privacy in dwelling-like 
locations, and therefore have not permitted game wardens to perform suspicionless 
administrative searches of ice fishing houses. See State v. Krenz, 634 N.W.2d 231, 
234 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001); State v. Larsen, 637 N.W.2d. 315, 316-20 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2001). 
72. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
73. See, e.g., State v. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d 1, 9-13 (Minn. 2003) (Page, J., dissenting). 
74. See Witty, supra note 11, at 175-76. 
75. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
76. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text. 
77. See Witty, supra note 11, at 152-54. Minnesota has even gone so far as to protect 
recreational hunting and fishing in its state constitution, declaring, "the taking of game 
and fish are a valued part of our heritage that shall be forever preserved for the people 
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in the fish and game context, realistic enforcement requires that game 
wardens have the ability to perform suspicionless-albeit limited-
searches and seizures. 78 
Accordingly, most disagreement over warrantless administrative 
searches against anglers and hunters lies in the third Burger prong, 
namely, that inspections be limited in time, place, and scope to areas 
where the person to be searched lacks a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.79 Much of the disagreement centers on the dissenters' belief 
that courts have used the administrative search exception to 
completely erode any expectation of privacy for anglers and hunters, 
despite statutes to the contrary.80 
For example, in Boyer, the dissent argued that the majority 
improperly focused on Boyer's expectation of privacy in the fish he 
possessed. 81 The dissent argued that the primary inquiry should have 
centered solely on Boyer's expectation of privacy in his boat and live 
well. 82 Commentators note that the majority was able to justify the 
warrantless intrusion onto the boat because it is widely accepted that 
anglers must display their catch upon demand.83 
Another argument against the fish and game search exception is 
that the definition of the anglers' and hunters' reasonable expectation 
of privacy is disconnected with the roots of the warrantless 
administrative search exception. 84 Proponents of hunters' and 
anglers' rights note that, whereas the fishing and hunting cases 
involve individuals engaging in recreation, the earlier administrative 
search cases focused on industries and businesses.85 Further, 
proponents of greater privacy protections argue that extending the 
administrative search exception to all closely regulated activities 
should be invalid, since the courts have declined to extend the 
and shall be managed by law and regulation for the public good." MINN. CONST. art. 
13, § 12. 
78. See Witty, supra note 11, at 153, 162-63. Enforcing fishing and game laws is a 
difficult task, even with the administrative search exception. See id. at 153. Hunters 
and anglers typically operate away from prying eyes, and game wardens are expected 
to patrol vast expanses of outdoor terrain. See People v. Maikhio, 253 P.3d 247, 261-
62 (Cal. 2011). Further, without close inspection, it is difficult to develop reasonable 
suspicion that an angler or hunter has procured unlawful game, rather than acceptable 
species. /d. Thus, a probable cause or reasonable suspicion requirement for fish and 
game inspections would render enforcement nearly impossible. /d. 
79. See Butterfoss & Daly, supra note 70, at 545. 
80. Stearns, supra note 46, at 207-09. 
81. State v. Boyer, 42 P.3d 771, 781-82 (Mont. 2002) (Nelson, J., dissenting). 
82. /d. 
83. Steams, supra note 46, at 210--13. 
84. See, e.g., State v. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d 1, 13-16 (Minn. 2003) (Page, J., dissenting). 
85. /d. 
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administrative search exception to roving vehicle stops to check for 
licenses or drunk drivers, even though driving is just as regulated as 
fishing and hunting. 86 
Although arguments to the contrary are compelling, it appears 
fruitless to contend that the wardens' suspicionless searches are 
unconstitutional. The Supreme Court denied certiorari for Colosimo 
and has yet to address the issue. 87 State and lower federal courts have 
upheld the majority of the warrantless administrative game warden 
searches.88 In fact, absent specific state laws that narrowly define the 
game warden's search authority,89 or a search of a structure that is 
akin to a home,90 the courts have overwhelmingly sided with the 
game wardens.91 Therefore, advocates for anglers' and hunters' 
privacy should not focus on attacking the exception's vitality in court 
but, instead, should propose other methods with a greater chance for 
success.92 
B. Raising the Floor: Using State Constitutions to Protect Privacy 
Not every state's constitution mirrors the protections of the United 
States Constitution.93 Although states may not mandate a narrower 
scope of protection, they may "raise the floor" and offer greater 
protection than the baseline rights under the United States 
Constitution.94 This practice is most notably used by states that 
86. !d. Justice Page claims that under the administrative search exception's expansion, 
anglers and hunters have fewer privacy rights than drunk drivers, who are protected 
against suspicionless stops by roving patrols. !d. at 13. 
87. State v. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 988 (2004). 
88. See, e.g., Elzey v. State, 519 S.E.2d 751,755 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999); People v. Maikhio, 
253 P.3d 247, 250 (Cal. 2011); State v. Keehner, 425 N.W.2d 41, 45 (Iowa 1988); 
Drane v. State, 493 So.2d 294, 297-98 (Miss. 1986); State v. Tourtillott, 618 P.2d 
423, 427-30 (Or. 1980); State v. Halverson, 277 N.W.2d 723, 724-25 (S.D. 1979); 
Monroe v. State, 253 S.W.2d 734, 735-36 (Tenn. 1952). 
89. See Witty, supra note 11, at 173-75. 
90. !d. at 169. 
91. !d. at 175-80. 
92. See infra Part III. C.!. 
93. See Paul H. Anderson & Julie A. Oseid, A Decision Tree Takes Root in the Land of 
10,000 Lakes: Minnesota's Approach to Protecting Individual Rights Under Both the 
United States and Minnesota Constitutions, 70 ALB. L. REv. 865, 894-95 (2007). For 
a discussion of the mechanics of achieving state constitutional amendment to protect 
individual rights, see G. Alan Tarr & Robert F. Williams, Foreword: Getting From 
Here to There: Twenty-First Century Mechanisms and Opportunities in State 
Constitutional Reform, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 1075, 1075-77 (2005). 
94. See Jeffrey A. Parness, American State Constitutional Equalities, 45 GONZ. L. REv. 
773, 788 (2010). 
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provide for broader equal protection rights and anti-discrimination 
measures. 95 Some commentators recognize that the practice of 
providing greater individual rights through state constitutional 
provisions could also be used to offer broader search and seizure 
rights than those afforded under the Fourth Amendment.96 
Notably, Montana's state constitution provides for greater privacy 
protection than under the Fourth Amendment.97 Under the Montana 
Constitution, "[t]he right of individual privacy is essential to the well-
being of a free society and shall not be infringed without the showing 
of a compelling state interest. "98 In several instances, such as thermal 
imaging99 and the automobile exception, 100 the Montana Supreme 
Court has interpreted this provision to grant greater privacy 
protection than under the Fourth Amendment. 101 
In the warrantless administrative search context, however, 
Montana's expanded privacy protection has yet to gain traction. 102 
Because game warden administrative searches are based on the 
state's interest in preserving its wildlife populations, courts have 
consistently valued the compelling state interest in wildlife 
preservation over the privacy of Montanan anglers and hunters. 103 So 
long as courts view wildlife preservation as a compelling state 
interest, a more expansive state constitutional measure beyond what 
Montana has provided would be required to offer anglers and hunters 
some greater privacy protection against suspicionless searches. 104 
95. !d. at 789. Scholars recognize four approaches that states take toward analyzing 
individual rights: (1) lockstep-where the state follows the U.S. Supreme Court's 
interpretation of the Constitution; (2) interstitial-where the state will look to its own 
state constitution only after analyzing the U.S. constitutional interpretation; (3) dual 
sovereignty-where the state court considers the federal and state constitution as 
equals; and (4) primacy-where the state constitution reigns. Anderson & Oseid, 
supra note 93, at 879-80. 
96. See Anderson & Oseid, supra note 93, at 894-95; cf Jack L. Landau, Should State 
Courts Depart from the Fourth Amendment? Search and Seizure, State Constitutions, 
and the Oregon Experience, 77 MISS. L.J. 369, 370 (2007) (arguing that states should 
not depart from Federal Fourth Amendment case Jaw). 
97. See Steams, supra note 46, at 191. 
98. MONT. CONST. art. II,§ 10. 
99. State v. Siegal, 934 P.2d 176, 191-192 (Mont. 1977). 
100. State v. Elison, 14 P.3d 456, 468-69 (Mont. 2000). 
101. See Steams, supra note 46, at 191. 
102. !d. at 213. 
103. State v. Boyer, 42 P.3d 771, 774-75 (Mont. 2002). 
104. See Steams, supra note 46, at 213. 
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Unfortunately for those who wish to expand individual privacy 
rights, state constitutional reform is not an easy process. 105 It can be 
difficult to motivate state legislators to undertake an involved task 
like state constitutional reform, especially for such a specialized class 
as recreational anglers and hunters. 106 
Further, many states simply interpret their own constitutions in 
lock-step fashion with the United States Constitution. 107 Maryland 
courts, for instance, interpret Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration 
of Rights as being in pari materia with the Fourth Amendment. 108 
Thus, in states that do not stray from the United States Constitution, 
efforts aimed at state constitutional reform would likely fail to 
improve individual privacy rights for anglers and hunters. 109 
C. A Pragmatic Balance of Privacy and Preservation 
1. The Suspicion Solution 
There is a "nuclear option" 110 for hunters and anglers to achieve 
heightened privacy protection. Through deregulation of the 
regulatory schemes for recreational fishing and hunting, anglers and 
hunters could remove the state's interest in their activity, hence 
crippling the game wardens' administrative search authority. 111 Such 
drastic measures would be a gross overcorrection, undermining noble 
efforts to preserve vital wildlife populations. 112 The cost of greatly 
reducing fish and game regulations would be too steep a price, as 
105. See Vladimir Kogan, The Irony of Comprehensive State Constitutional Reform, 41 
RUTGERS L.J. 881, 882, (20 1 0). 
106. See id. at 890-91. 
107. See Anderson & Oseid, supra note 93, at 880-81. 
108. See Jones v. State, 407 Md. 33, 46 n.2, 962 A.2d 393, 400 n.2 (2008). The Latin 
phrase, "in pari materia," means "[o]n the same subject" or "relating to the same 
matter." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 807 (8th ed. 2004). 
109. Cf Anderson & Oseid, supra note 93, at 881 (criticizing the limitation of the 
"lockstep" approach for state constitutions). 
II 0. "Nuclear option," often used in political discussions, refers to the most drastic 
solution to a problem. Cf Stephanie Dinan, Senate 'Nukes' Amendments: Reid's 
'Nuclear Option' vs. GOP Likely to Heighten Acrimony, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2011, 
at A4, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/oct/6/reid-uses-
nuclear-option-block-gop-amendments/?page=all (discussing a drastic legislative 
strategy to forward a particular agenda). 
111. Cf supra text accompanying note 39 (explaining the three requirements under New 
York v. Burger for a warrantless administrative search). 
112. Witty, supra note 11, at 192-93. 
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most states would balk at subjecting fragile wildlife populations to 
the whims of their citizens. 113 
Yet privacy advocates fear a slippery slope of unchecked searches 
performed at the whim of a game warden, which they believe will 
proliferate in the wake of Colosimo and Boyer. 114 A middle path is 
required in order to strike a reasonable balance between privacy and 
preservation. 115 
The Supreme Court of California demonstrated the possibility of 
such a middle path when it upheld a game warden's warrantless 
administrative inspection in People v. Maikhio. 116 There, a game 
warden spotted Maikhio from a distance using a hand line to fish 
what appeared to be a lobster. 117 The warden observed Maikhio put 
his catch into a black bag and then return to his car to leave the 
pier. 118 The warden subsequently stopped Maikhio's vehicle and 
developed suspicion of a violation after questioning Maikhio.119 
Then the warden executed a search of the vehicle and found a spiny 
lobster, which was out of season. 120 
Maikhio was charged for possessing a spiny lobster during closed 
season and for failing to exhibit his catch when commanded by the 
game warden. 121 Maikhio contended that the warden's search was 
unconstitutional, as he was in his vehicle attempting to leave the pier 
and the warden did not have reasonable suspicion of a fishing 
violation when he stopped the vehicle. 122 The Court, however, sided 
with the game warden. 123 
In holding that the game warden's actions were constitutional, the 
Maikhio Court examined the state's fish and game codes to determine 
the scope of the warden's authority to perform warrantless stops and 
searches. 124 Under section 1006 of the California Fish and Game 
Code, wardens may search for fish and game only in places where the 
fish and game may be stored or hidden. 125 Further, under section 
113. !d. 
114. See, e.g., Steams, supra note 46, at 213. 
115. See Witty, supra note II, at 189-93. 
116. People v. Maikhio, 253 P.3d 247,250 (Cal. 2011). 
117. /d.at251-52. 
118. /d. at 249-50. 
119. See id. at 250. 
120. /d. 
121. !d. at 253. 
122. /d. 
123. /d. at 250. 
124. !d. at 254-55. 
125. /d. Section 1006 provides that wardens may inspect, "[a]ll boats, markets, stores and 
other buildings, except dwellings, and all receptacles, except the clothing actually 
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2012 of the Fish and Game Code, hunters and anglers must exhibit 
their game, licenses, and equipment upon demand of a game 
warden. 126 
The Court interpreted sections 1006 and 2012 as granting statutory 
authority for game wardens to make brief stops of individuals as long 
as the wardens had reasonable suspicion that the person recently was 
fishing or hunting. 127 Even without suspicion of a fish or game 
violation, the Court held that a stop is permissible for the purpose of 
demanding display of proper licensure for any fish or game that the 
stopped person possessed. 128 Further, the Court held that such stops 
could be made on vehicles, so long as the warden reasonably believed 
that the occupants had recently been hunting or fishing. 129 
Because the game warden developed probable cause before 
searching Maikhio' s vehicle, the Court refrained from deciding 
whether section 1006 authorized warrantless searches without 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion of a violation. 130 Yet the facts 
behind the Maikhio decision131 suggest a simple procedure for future 
warrantless administrative searches in the fish and game context. 132 
Namely, that any additional search of a vehicle or container would 
only be permissible if the warden developed suspicion of a violation 
during the initial, lawful stop. Thus, under the "Suspicion Solution," 
had the game warden in Maikhio failed to develop probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion of a violation during his stop of Maikhio, the 
worn by a person at the time of inspection, where birds, mammals, fish, reptiles, or 
amphibia may be stored, placed, or held for sale or storage." CAL. FISH & GAME CODE 
§ 1006 (West 1998). 
126. Maikhio, 253 P.3d at 255. Section 2012 provides that: 
All licenses, tags, and the birds, mammals, fish, reptiles, or 
amphibians taken or otherwise dealt with under this code, and any 
device or apparatus designed to be, and capable of being, used to 
take birds, mammals, fish, reptiles, or amphibians shall be 
exhibited upon demand to any person authorized by the 
department to enforce this code or any law relating to the 
protection and conservation of birds, mammals, fish, reptiles, or 
amphibians. 
CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 2012 (West Supp. 2009) (emphasis added). 
127. Maikhio, 253 P.3d at 256. 
128. /d. at 255-56. 
129. /d. at 256. 
130. !d. at 266 n.18. 
131. See supra text accompanying notes 117-20. 
132. Notably, the game warden only searched Maikhio's vehicle and bag after Maikhio 
lied to the game warden about poaching off the pier that evening. Maikhio, 253 P .3d 
at 266. 
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game warden would not have been authorized to search Maikhio's 
vehicle or bag. 
Free from the empty provisions claiming that searches may only be 
made upon probable cause of a violation, as in Montana and 
Minnesota, 133 the Maikhio Court's interpretation of California's fish 
and game laws struck a more sensible balance of preservation and 
privacy. Whereas the Boyer and Colosimo courts established 
seemingly discretionless authority for administrative searches of any 
place that fish and game may be located, 134 the Maikhio Court 
established a clear procedure for wardens to effectuate stops of 
suspected hunters and anglers. 135 
The Colosimo and Boyer holdings were troubling for dissenters 
because of the courts' seemingly selective statutory enforcemene36 
and willingness to embolden game wardens with discretionless search 
authority. 137 The Maikhio Court's interpretation of the state's fish 
and game laws suggests that statutes can be tailored to not only 
ensure regulatory enforcement, 138 but prevent situations such as in 
Boyer and Colosimo where the game warden had the authority to 
perform a suspicionless inspection of the angler's boat. 139 
Ultimately, the Maikhio holding demonstrates that, with specific 
fishing and game codes, a state can narrow the authority of game 
wardens without jeopardizing the preservation of a state's wildlife 
population by severely limiting wardens' enforcement capabilities. 140 
States across the country face an ongoing struggle between their 
preservation goals and privacy concerns. 141 Rather than allow the 
courts to further expand the administrative search exception, state 
legislatures should expand upon the Maikhio holding and strive to 
better define a game warden's warrantless administrative search 
authority. The California Supreme Court's interpretation of the 
state's fish and game laws offers a measured and pragmatic way to 
appease both sides of a contentious issue. 
133. MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 97A.215 (West 2009); MONT. CODE ANN.§ 87-1-502(6). 
134. See discussion supra Part II.B (examining the Boyer and Colosimo holdings). 
135. See Maikhio, 253 P.3d at 256. 
136. See, e.g., Butterfoss & Daly, supra note 70, at 549; Steams supra note 46, at 206-11 
(explaining how the decision in Boyer is inconsistent with Montana's constitution and 
statutory authority). 
137. See Butterfoss & Daly, supra note 70, at 554. 
138. See Maikhio, 253 P.3d at 256. 
139. See supra Part II.B (discussing the State v. Boyer and State v. Colosimo holdings). 
140. See Maikhio, 253 P.3d at 256. 
141. See supra text accompanying notes 40-45. 
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2. Applying the Suspicion Solution to Maryland's Fish and Game 
Laws 
Maryland may not boast 10,000 lakes like Minnesota or cover as 
broad a territory as California and Montana, but the Chesapeake Bay 
is unique and precious to the state's history and tradition. 142 In order 
to protect the fragile estuary and its wildlife denizens, Maryland has 
comprehensive statutes and regulations to oversee the abundant 
recreational fishing and hunting that occurs in the state. 143 In light of 
recent environmental pressures, Maryland has altered its enforcement 
of fishing laws and regulations. 144 State legislators have tried to 
address problems of poaching fish out of season and fishing without 
proper equipment. 145 Although new equipment may aid game 
wardens in the fight against improper fishing tactics, Department of 
Natural Resources officials will likely have situations in which they 
must directly interact with individuals enjoying the bay's waters. 146 
Such interactions could lead to unwelcome interactions between 
game wardens and anglers, and disputes over privacy rights could 
arise. 147 
Similar to Boyer and Colosimo, Maryland's fish and game laws 
seem to provide contradictory standards regarding a game warden's 
search authority. 148 Although hunters and anglers are mandated to 
exhibit their catches, licenses, and equipment upon demand by a 
142. The Chesapeake Bay, the largest estuary in North America, is home to 3,600 different 
plant and animal species. Bay Area Facts, CHESAPEAKE BAY FOUNDATION, 
http://www.cbf.org/page.aspx?pid=433 (last visited June 10, 2013). 
143. See, e.g., Mo. CODE ANN., NAT. REs. §§ 4-101 to -1211 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 
2011) (Maryland's Fish and Fisheries Codes); id. §§ 10-101 to -1203 (LexisNexis 
2007 & Supp. 2011) (Maryland's Wildlife Codes). 
144. See Candus Thomas, War on Rocliflsh Poaches: Police Have new Tools, new Laws, to 
Avoid Repeat of Last Year, BALT. SUN, Jan. 5, 2012, at A2. 
145. !d. 
146. See Candus Thomas, State Proposes New Policies to Prevent Rocliflsh Poaching, 
BALT. SUN, July 15, 2011, at A3. 
147. Maryland natural resources officials face a continuing problem with unlawful conduct 
by recreational anglers. See Don Markus, 60 Recreational Fishermen Face Loss of 
License, BALT. SUN, Sept. 13, 2011, at Dl. 
148. Compare MONT. CODE ANN.§ 87.1.506(l)(b) (West 2007) (searches of anglers only 
upon probable cause), and MINN. STAT. ANN. § 97A.215, subdiv. 1 (West 2009) 
(searches of anglers only upon probable cause), with Mo. CODE ANN., NAT. REs. §§ 4-
1204 (LexisNexis 2005), 10-1104 (LexisNexis 2007) (probable cause required to 
search anglers and hunters respectively). 
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game warden, 149 there are also provisions that prohibit warrantless 
searches without probable cause. 150 
Maryland has not had such a dispute go to an appellate court; 
however, Maryland could set a dangerous precedent, as occurred in 
Colosimo, based on the state's similarly contradictory fish and game 
laws. 151 Thus, the Maryland General Assembly should amend its fish 
and game laws to reflect the procedures adopted in Maikhio. Rather 
than promise no intrusion on less than probable cause, 152 the law 
should provide that wardens are free to stop suspected anglers or 
hunters to demand exhibition of licenses and any fish or game that 
the person possess. 153 Then, under the Suspicion Solution, game 
wardens could only conduct a more invasive search after developing 
independent suspicion of a violation. 154 
This would permit the game wardens to carry out their authority to 
inspect licenses and wildlife while keeping a barrier in place before 
the warden could search a vehicle or container. 155 Without this 
procedure, as in Colosimo and Boyer, Maryland hunters and anglers 
could be subjected to suspicionless entries onto their boats or into 
their vehicles merely because they have been hunting or fishing. 156 
Under the Suspicion Solution, this would add an extra procedural 
step to ensure that wardens' inspections are properly limited without 
placing undue burdens on enforcement. 157 
Ultimately, it would be in Maryland's best interest to follow the 
Suspicion Solution and adopt more narrowly defined fish and game 
laws. 158 As wildlife resources in the Chesapeake Bay and in the 
western mountains dwindle, state officials face greater pressures to 
enforce fish and game laws in both the recreational and commercial 
arenas. 159 Thus, a measured approach, as utilized in Maikhio, would 
be a prudent path for Maryland to follow in order to maintain its 
149. Mo. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. § 10-306 (display of a hunter's license); id. § 4-610 
(display of angler's license). 
150. /d. §§ 4-1204, 10-1104 (probable cause required to search fishers and hunters 
respectively). 
15 i. See discussion supra Part II. B. 
152. NAT. REs. §§ 4-1204, 10-1104 (probable cause required to search anglers and hunters 
respectively). 
153. See People v. Maikhio, 253 P.3d 247,256 (Cal. 2011). 
154. See discussion supra Part III.C.l. 
155. See discussion supra Part III. C. I. 
156. See discussion supra Part II. B. 
157. See discussion supra Part III.C.l. 
158. See supra text accompanying notes 146-52. 
159. See Markus, supra note 147; Thomas, supra note 147. 
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anglers' and hunters' privacy while ensuring enforcement of its fish 
and game laws. 160 
IV. CONCLUSION 
It can be difficult to navigate the delicate balance between privacy 
rights and the need for law enforcement to investigate wrongdoing. 161 
As this comment demonstrates, the balancing act is especially 
difficult when nontraditional law enforcement, such as game 
wardens, attempt to execute their duties to preserve vulnerable 
natural resources. 162 
A uniform approach to this national issue would be a futile 
exercise. 163 Not only do states have divergent approaches to the 
authority afforded to game wardens, but recreational hunting and 
fishing are valued differently as well. 164 Ultimately, however, the 
Suspicion Solution likely is the most practical approach to address 
the issue. 165 The emphasis on narrowly drawn statutes and 
regulations would enable the model to work in any state. 166 It could 
accommodate one state's preference for greater wildlife protection 
and another state's preference for greater privacy for anglers and 
hunters. 167 
Maryland should examine its fish and game laws. 168 Although 
there have apparently been no legal disputes over the inconsistencies 
in the law, that does not mean that concerned citizens should refrain 
from being proactive. 169 As Maryland is home to the largest estuary 
in North America, 170 opportunities abound for interaction between 
game wardens and anglers. 171 
160. See discussion supra Part Ill. C. I. 
161. See discussion supra Part II. B. 
162. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
163. See discussion supra Parts liLA-B. 
164. For instance, not every state finds it necessary to provide for the preservation of 
recreational fishing and hunting in its state constitution, as does Minnesota. See 
MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 12. For a detailed survey of various state constitutional 
provisions regarding fish and game rights, see Jeffrey Omar Ussman, The Game is 
Afoot: Constitutionalizing the Right to Hunt and Fish in the Tennessee Constitution, 
77 TENN. L. REv. 57, 77-90 (2009). 
165. See discussion supra Part Ill. C. 
166. See discussion supra Part III. C. 
16 7. See discussion supra Part III. C. 
168. See discussion supra Part III.C. 
169. See CFB Action Center, CHESAPEAKE BAY FOUNDATION, http://capwiz.com/cbf/home/ 
(last visited June 10, 2013); discussion supra Part II.B. 
170. See Bay Area Facts, supra note 142. 
171. Nearly 10 million people live on, or near, the shores of the Chesapeake Bay. !d. 
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Rather than waiting to react to a future dispute, state legislators and 
regulators could amend the state's fish and game statutes and 
regulations to ensure that the game wardens can protect the state's 
rich wildlife without sacrificing reasonable boundaries on individual 
privacy rights. 172 Failure to do so could result in a dangerous 
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